TRENDS IN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAW
OF WESTERN COUNTRIES*
MAx RHEI NsThiN

In a world of profound and accelerating change, the institution of marriage has
been standing out as a pillar of stability. Yet, it has not remained completely unaffected and those changes which have occurred have been reflected in the legal
rules which have grown up to guarantee and regulate the institution. The social
and legal phenomena which have appeared in the course of this process have varied
not only between different countries, but even between the states of our own nation.
If we analyze these differences from a long-range point of view, we can find that
they reflect two major trends, which are related to each other, viz., those of secularization and liberalization. These trends have not been operative everywhere with
equal strength and they have hardly anywhere been unopposed. From this interplay of forces there have emerged varying compromises, often of an uneasy and
unstable nature.
There are several countries in which, in accordance with the once universal
rule, marriage is still treated as indissoluble in any way other than death, which
means, in other words, that the institution of divorce does not exist. Thus is the
situation in such strictly Catholic countries as Italy, Spain, the Irish Republic,
Argentina, Brazil, or Quebec
In the majority of countries, the institution of divorce has come to be admitted,
but in many it is dominated by an idea which was developed in the ecclesiastical
courts in a different context. The ecclesiastical courts of the Catholic Church as
well as of the various Protestant churches have long known the institution of
judicial separation (separatio a mensa et thoro), in which a party to a marriage
was absolved from his duty to live with the other without being freed, however,
from the tie of the marriage, which would thus continue to prevent any remarriage
during the lifetime of the other spouse. On its face a decree of separation would
do no more than authoritatively pronounce that the petitioner's refusal to live with
the other party is not sinful. The decree is also of practical importance because it
lays the foundation for a claim of support where it has been obtained by the wife, or,
where it has been obtained by the husband, makes clear that he is under no duty
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to furnish support to the wife. In view of this character of the proceedings it
became established that no decree of judicial separation would be granted to a party
to a marriage unless the other had been guilty of a serious breach of marital duty,
such as adultery on the wife's part, or extreme cruelty or abandonment on that
of the husband. It was also established that a spouse should not be entitled to a
decree of separation unless he had conducted himself as a true and faithful husband
or wife, as the case might be. A judicial separation was thus to be a punishment
for a guilty spouse and a reward for an innocent. In the context this approach was
thoroughly sensible. Strangely, however, it was transferred in many places to the
different proceedings in which ecclesiastical or, more commonly, secular courts
were to decide whether the parties to a marriage which had broken down were to
be freed from its tie and thus to be restored to the freedom of remarriage. Divorce
thus was predicated upon the notion of guilt, to be granted only in the case of some
serious misconduct by one party against another who has conducted himself with
marital exemplariness. The divorce statutes thus came to contain lists of so-called
"grounds for divorce"' as well as to establish what has become known as the
principle of recrimination. The latter, however, was not adopted or preserved
generally and the statutory lists of divorce vary greatly, from the narrowness of
such laws as that of New York, where adultery still constitutes the only ground,3
to the liberalism of such laws as those of California 4 or France,6 where a divorce is
obtainable upon the ground of "cruelty" or some equivalent concept applied by the
courts in such a way as to cover all, or almost all, conduct of a spouse which is felt
to be offensive by the other or even simply declared by the latter to be so. The
general trend over the last one hundred and fifty years, at least until recently, has been
to enlarge the statutory list of grounds, or, by judicial practice, to broaden their
meaning, or both. Still, such laws limit divorce to cases of guilty conduct and thus
preclude divorce in those cases where a marriage has become unbearable or distasteful without either party having been guilty of any special marital misconduct.
Such a factual breakdown may occur not only in the case of one party's insanity,
but also in those other situations where the spouses have come to hate, or simply to
tire of, each other. Statutes allowing a divorce in such cases of mere factual breakdown constitute a minority. Incurable insanity of a spouse, it is true, has been
admitted by a steadily increasing number of laws,6 but divorce by mutual agree'For typical catalogues of this kind see England: Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, 1 Enw. 8 & i Gro.
6, c. 57; Germany: Marriage Law of July 6, 1938, [X938] REicHSGESE'BLATr 1, 807, re-cnacted by the
Allied Control Council as Control Council Law No. 16 of Feb. 20, 1946; or ILL. REv. STAT. C. 40, §X
(95').
'N. Y. Civ. PaAc. AcT §1147.

'CAL. CIV. CODE §§92, 94 (949).
'CrVIL CODE art. 231: Either party to a marriage may sue for a divorce on the ground of excesses,
cruel treatment by, or seriously offensive conduct (injures graves) of, the other.
'See, for instance: Denmark: Marriage Law of June 30, 1922, §63 (3 years); Germany: Marriage
Law of July 6, 1938, [1938] REICHSGEETZBLArr I, 8oi, re-enacted as Control Council No. 16 of Feb.
20, 1946, §45 ("A party to a marriage may apply for a divorce if the other is insane, provided that the
disease has reached a stage at which the intellectual community of the spouses has been destroyed and
the restoration of this community cannot be expected"); England: Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, 1 EDw.
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ment or because of one party's "insurmountable aversion" against the other can
still be found only in few laws (the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Belgium,
and in a steadily growing number of jurisdictions in this country),T although it
was provided for in the earliest of all modern divorce laws, the Prussian Decree of
1752.8 As a characteristic feature of our field we also find in many places a discrepancy between a theoretically strict law and actual practices thereunder, achieved
through the use of more or less generally indulged collusive practices. Illustrations
are afforded by such typical states of our country as Illinois, and also by a number
of foreign countries such as France
The divergency of approaches has also found expression in vacillating shifts
within the same country; here France stands as typical. In keeping with the
8 & i GEo. 6, c. 57, §176(d) (5 years); Finland: Marriage Law of June 13, 1929, §75 (normally
3 years); Iceland: Marriage Law of June 27, i921; Norway: Law on Conclusion and Dissolution of
Marriage of May 15, 1918, c. 5, §53 (3 years); Portugal: Decree Introducing Divorce of Nov. 3, 91o,
art. 4, No. 7 (3 years); Sweden: Marriage Law of June 11, 1920, c. is, §13 (3 years); Switzerland:
Civil Code of Dec. Io, 1907, art. 141 (3 years). In the United States, insanity has been admitted as
a ground for divorce in 27 states. Cf. FowLER V. HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 390 (952).
'In Sweden the significant provisions are contained in Chapter is of the Marriage Law of June ii,
192o which reads as follows:
"§I. Where the parties to a marriage cannot continue to live together because of a thoroughgoing
and permanent discord and where they have agreed to live separate, they are entitled to a judicial decree
of separation.
"§2, par. 2. Where in consequence of the diversity of their characters and attitudes toward life or
because of other reasons a thoroughgoing and permanent discord has arisen between the parties to a
marriage, either party is entitled to a judicial decree of separation unless his own conduct or other
special circumstances render it proper that he be required to continue to live with the other party.
"§3. Where a decree of judicial separation has been rendered and the parties have thereafter lived
for one year separate and apart of each other, either party is entitled to a 'decree of divorce, unless the
parties have resumed their cohabitation."
The laws of Denmark (Law of June 30, i922 Concerning the Conclusion and Dissolution of Marriage, c. 6, §§52, 53 (par. 2), 54: divorce by administrative decree after six months' separation); Finland
(Marriage Law of June 13, 1929, Pt. III, c. I, §76: divorce after 2 years of factual separation). Iceland
(Law of June 28, 1921, §§55 etseq.) and Norway (Law of May 15, 1918, Concerning Marriage and
Divorce, c. 5, §§41, 43: divorce by administrative decree) are similar.
Under the Swiss Civil Code of Dec. 1o, 19o7, art. 142, either party is entitled to a judicial decree
of divorce "where the marital relation has been so deeply shattered that the parties cannot be properly
expected to continue their marital community."
The Belgium Code, which is the Code Napoleon, as modified by local legislation, has preserved the
provision of Article 233 of the original text, which was abolished in France in 1816, and which reads
as follows: "The mutual and serious agreement of the parties, if it has been declared in the form prescribed by law and has been preceded by their examination as provided by law, constitutes proof of
the fact that life in common is unbearable to them and that there exists between them a valid cause
for divorce." The procedure is so much more cumbersome and time consuming than that in cases of
divorce upon the ground of cruelty, that divorce by mutual consent seems to be be rarely used.
In this country a divorce can be obtained in 16 jurisdictions (Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia,
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) if the parties have lived factually separated from each other
for a stated period of time, and in four states (Minnesota, North Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia)
if a judicial separation is not followed by a reconciliation (cf. FOwLER V. HARPER, PROBLEMS OF
FAMILY 658-659

(952)).

'See note 26, infra.
' In the latter country it seems to be not uncommon that the offensive letter which is to constitute
the ground of injure grave is agreed upon between the parties.
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Catholic character of the state, marriage was treated as indissoluble all through
the ancien r gime. The Revolution of 1789 brought the extremely liberal divorce
law of 1792, which even provided the possibility of the dissolution of a marriage
upon the mutual agreement of the parties. Through Napoleon's Civil Code of 1804
divorce was made more difficult, and under the Bourbon restoration, the wheel
was turned back fully and divorce was completely abolished in i816, not to be reintroduced again until the Third Republic's liberal, but cautious, law of 1884. A
practice of continuously increasing liberalism was again reversed by the legislation
of Marshal Petain's Vichy government, but this, in turn, was repealed upon the
liberation of France in 1945.1"
Yet, in spite of all divergencies and vagaries, modern developments in the field
of marriage and divorce have been characterized by the two trends of secularization
and liberalization. In order to understand and evaluate their impact, it is necessary
to sketch the state of affairs against which these trends have been operating and
the ways in which it came into being.
Today, we take it for granted, at least in the Occident, that marriage is subject
to regulation by the state. This notion has not always prevailed, however; as a
matter of fact, it is of fairly recent origin.
Throughout antiquity, the state kept aloof from regulating so personal and
intimate a relationship as marriage, which was regarded as a distinctly private affair
of the individuals concerned. Not that the individual would have been free to enter
upon any kind of sexual relationship of his own free choosing. There were religious taboos probably everywhere and in the case of some people, especially the
Hebrews, religion developed an elaborate marriage code11 which, under the theocratic
form of government, was hardly distinguishable from state regulation. There
were also the set patterns of the mores, which effectively stabilized kinship and sex
relations and which could not be flouted without serious social sanctions. But the
state, its laws, and its courts were concerned with marriage only indirectly. Rome
presents not only an important but also a typical example. For a variety of purposes
it was important for the courts to know whether or not a particular relationship
constituted a marriage. Of Roman society it can properly be said that it was
composed not so much of individuals as of families.' 2 With some justification
it can be asserted that down into the times of the Empire, private rights and
duties, such as property title, contractual claims or obligations, pertained solely
to the heads of households, the patres familias. It thus became necessary to ascertain
who belonged to a household as the wife or child of a pater familias so as to de10 Decree of April 12, 1945.
On the history of French divorce law, see Jacob, Problems of Divorce
in France Incident to the Statutes of 1941, 28 IowA L. REv. 298 (1943).
"Lev. x8:6-23; 20:10-21; Num. 5:11-31; Deut. 22:13-30; 23:1-8; 24:1-4.
"uOn Roman marriage and family, see James Bryce, Marriage and Divorce Under Roman and

English Law, 2 STUDIES IN HIsToRY AND JURIsPRtuDENCE 381 (igoi), reprinted in 3 SELECTrED ESSAYS
IN ANGLO-AMERCAN LEGAL HISTORY 782 (1909); FREDEuIcK P. WALTON, INTRODUCTIoN To ROMAN LAW
70 (4th ed. i92o); CmARLEs R. NOYEs, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY r22 (1936); VILLIAM W. Bucm-

LAND, A TExaoO0K OF ROMAN LAw FROM AuGuSTus TO JUSTINIAN 101 (2d ed. 1932); Fm-v
CLAssiCAL ROMAN LAw 103 (r951).
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termine, for instance, to whose acquisitions he would acquire title or for whose
torts he would be liable or, quite particularly, who would be entitled to his property after his death. As monogamous marriage was established by the mores as
the basis of a family relationship, it was necessary to know in a particular case
whether or not a marriage had been concluded or terminated. However, the law
not only failed to prescribe any particular formalities for the conclusion of a marriage, but also refrained from either establishing impediments to marriage beyond
the ancient incest taboos or limiting in any way individual freedom at any time
to dissolve a marriage or even requiring for such dissolution the permission or
cooperation of any court or other governmental agency. In earlier times this
freedom of divorce pertained, it is true, only to men, but during the late republican
period it also came to be enjoyed by women. As divorces became increasingly
frequent, imperial legislation found it necessary to some extent to regulate the
effects of a divorce upon the parties' property rights against each other, and such
legislation was sought to be used as an indirect means to discourage divorces, but
never to its very end did the Roman state try to abolish the freedom of private
parties to conclude and to terminate their marriages as their own affairs, upon their
own volition, and through their own act. No court decree or other act of government was ever required in Rome as a constituent element of a divorce and never
was there engendered the idea that a divorce would not be possible except upon
1'cause."
Neither in Rome nor anywhere else in the ancient world did this complete
absence of legal restraints upon divorce result in a breakdown of the institutions
of marriage or the family. Both indeed are social, institutions rather than legal
ones, even in our society, where the state has assumed such a large role in their
regulation. The duties which are incumbent upon marriage partners have their
guarantee and sanction in the moral or religious conscience of the parties, in established traditions, and in social conventions. Only in marginal situations does the
law step in with its clumsy arsenal of courts, sheriffs, and jailors, to supplement the
sanctions of the mores, and to clarify doubtful situations. In the more homogeneous
societies of the past the social sanctions were sufficiently effective to maintain those
patterns of family relationships which the folkways had developed and which the
society in question regarded as the proper ones. In the mores of the Roman Republic in particular, matrimony and the family occupied a position of high dignity
and a man's action would not easily be condoned if he cast off his wife without grave
reason, whatever legal freedom he might have had to do so. In the late Republic
and the early Empire, the strictness of the old Roman morals was considerably relaxed and especially among the upper classes of the capital city free divorce became
socially acceptable and was practiced freely; but even then this freedom does not
seem to have resulted in a breakdown of the family.
The same absence of state regulation of marriage and divorce which existed
in Rome, we find among the Germanic peoples"3 who entered the scene of history
"

Cf.

RUDOLF HUEBNER,

A

HIsToRy oF GrRmANIC PRIVATE

LAw 588 (Philbrick's transl. r9t8).

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

in the last centuries of antiquity. Indeed, their state, just as that of other primitive
peoples, in so far as it existed at all, was much too rudimentary to concern itself
with such matters as marriage and divorce. The conclusion of a marriage, for
which the law did not require any formalities, was a transaction between the groom
and the bride's family. No legal rule prevented the husband from freely repudiating
his wife, but before availing himself of that freedom, he might well consider whether
he might not thereby endanger his standing with the community and whether
he might not find himself confronted with the unpleasant choice between a blood
feud with the repudiated wife's sib, and the possibility of buying it off by some
heavy payment. In the later Frankish period social disapproval of divorce seems
to have been less strong than it is said by Tacitus to have been in earlier days, and
women also seem to have acquired a social status which allowed them to walk out
of a marriage which had become distasteful.
The complete absence of any formal regulation of marriage and divorce, which
was characteristic for Rome as well as for the Germanic peoples, was radically
changed by that third element which entered into the making of the Middle Ages
and thus of our modern world, i., Christianity. In the Jewish setting, in which
it originated, all aspects of life were permeated with religious significance 2nd under
the theocratic form of government religious regulation inevitably was to be state
regulation, too. But there was surprisingly little authoritative regulation of marriage. While the strictness of the religious code of sexual mores distinguished the
Jews from most other peoples of the ancient Orient, the conclusion of a marriage
was not subject to much regulation apart from the incest taboos of the Book of
Leviticus. It was a private affair the validity of which did not depend upon the
observation of any formalities. Divorce, too, was freely permissible to the husband,
subject only to informal censure by the community. An entirely new element was
injected, however, by Christianity, viz., the idea that marriage is a sacrament and
that, for that reason, it is indissoluble by man. The rise of this notion is not
entirely clear just as it is doubtful what Jesus meant by those Scriptural passages
upon which the doctrine came to be based. 4 Quite possibly he meant only that a man
who wished to attain the exemplary religious life should not avail himself of
that possibility of freely repudiating a wife which was open to him under the
Mosaic law. By that law no more was required of him than that he gave her,
as evidence of her freedom from marriage ties, his letter of divorcement. Divorce
as it has come to be widely understood in our days, viz., in the sense of a more
or less amicable parting of the ways of two partners of equal status, was hardly
a problem in Jewish society of Jesus' days. Yet, whatever Jesus may have meant
by his sayings, they were made the foundation of the new doctrine of the sacramental character of marriage and its consequential indissolubility. This doctrine
was both new and sublime.
"'Matt. 5:31-32;

Mark

10:9-12;

Luke x6:i8.
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A sacrament, as understood in Christian doctrine, is a visible sign which, by its
very operation, confers grace on him who worthily receives it. 5 It was not until the
sixteenth century that the Church declared celebration before a priest to be essential
for the validity of a marriage. The sacrament of matrimony is thus administered
not by the priest to the parties but by the parties to each other.' As the marriage
is not consummated until the parties have had sexual intercourse' 7 the doctrine of
the sacramental nature of matrimony means that man's most animalic act is sanctified and elevated to the level of the divine and that the union thus created is to be
a constant bridge between this world and the Kingdom of Heaven. This sublime
idea also, of course, implies the demand that the parties to the marriage at all
times strive to live up in their relationship to that level which renders them worthy
of the divine grace. It is this demand which implies the indissolubility of the
union by any act of the parties which would, of necessity, indicate their unworthiness of the sacrament.
The demand is a lofty one, not always easy to live up to, especially for one who
is not fortified by faith and belief in the total body of the creed of the Church.
But, while the Church was the dominant force in Western society, it formalized
its demand as a part of that peculiar body of rules which, although not the law
of the state, were nevertheless law in the sense of a body of rules for human
behavior which are authoritatively and formally pronounced and expounded by
courts, and enforced by a special staff of officers. Through this, canon law, as
applied in its ecclesiastical courts, the Church for the first time in the Western
world elaborated and established a formalized regulatory system with respect to
marriage, both as to the requirements for its valid conclusion and the duties which
it entails for the parties. An essential role in this body of ecclesiastical law was
played by the principle of indissolubility of marriage and the heavy duties implied.
To render this body of rules effective and, particularly, to enforce its principle
of indissolubility of marriage, was no easy task for the Church. It took centuries
until the postulates became generally accepted. Not only had the Church to repress the resistance and urge of unruly peoples who had not been accustomed to
such rigid norms, but also, in its effort to exercise jurisdiction through its courts,
the Church came into conflict with the new power of the temporal state that was
nascent everywhere upon the ruins of the ancient empire of the Romans. Yet, in
spite of all difficulties the Church succeeded in making its courts and its matri"The normal definition of sacrament is found in Hugh of St. Victor's (1o96-1141)

De Sacramentis

(Book I, Part IX, Cap. II): "Sacramentum est corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum, ex similitudine repraesentans, et ex institutione significans, et ex sanctificatione continens, aliquam
invisibilem et spiritualem gratiam." The Anglican Catechism defines it as follows: "An outward
and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given unto us; ordained by Christ himself, as a means
whereby we receive the same, and a pledge to assure us thereof."
16 "Matrimony is a lawful and exclusive contract by which a man and a woman mutually give and
accept a right over their bodies for the purpose of acts which are in themselves suitable for the generation of children." Timo-mr L. BOUSCAREN, S. J., AND A. C. ELLIS, S. K., CANON LAW, A TEXT AND
COMmENTARY 399 (1946); Cf. CODEX JtMS CANONICI, CANONS 1012, 1013, io8i.
".CODEX

JURIS CANONICI, CANON 1015, §1.
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monial law effective everywhere from Scandinavia to Sicily and from Portugal to
the Territory of the Teutonic Knights on the shores of the Baltic. Some concessions had to be made. While divorce remained excluded, annulment became
possible to such an extent that it came to satisfy a large part of the demand for
a way out of a marriage that had become distasteful. The most effective means
in that respect was created through the continuous expansion of the scope of
prohibited degrees which grew to be so comprehensive that it was a rare case in
which it would not have been possible to discover an impediment once a termination of a marriage was sought. However, in decisive contrast to the pre-Christian
state of affairs, it was now necessary, for the termination of a marriage, to institute
formal proceedings in a court, to submit to an official investigation, and to obtain
a formal decree. A marriage could no longer be terminated by the informal,
private, extra-judicial act of the parties, and this principle of the necessity of an
authoritative act of a court or some other official agency has remained a part of our
law ever since. It was established, together with the principle of authoritative,
formalized, "legal" regulation of marriage, in the course of that portentous trend
which had led from informal regulation through the folkways and mores to control
and regulation by the institutionalized religion of the Catholic Church.
That trend found its completion in the establishment by the Council of Trent'
of the rule that not even the conclusion of a marriage should any longer be possible
by the parties' private act, without the official cooperation of a functionary of the
Church. However, before that stage of completion was reached, there had already
set in that new trend of secularization of marriage in which regulation by the
State came to be substituted for that by the Church and which in its course came
to engender the concomitant trend of liberalization, by which the principle of
indissolubility of marriage came to be undermined or even nullified.
This trend of secularization of marriage can be traced to three main roots, viz.,
the doctrines of the Protestant reformers, the political postulates of Gallicanism, and
the ideas of enlightenment and liberal natural law.'9
The Protestant Reformation exercised its influence in two ways: it repudiated
the dogma of the sacramental character of matrimony, thereby opening the way for
divorce, and transferred responsibility for the legal regulation of marriage from
the Church to the State. The notion that marriage is "an external worldly thing,
subject to secular jurisdiction, just like dress and food, home and field," as Luther
expressed it,"0 did not, of course, mean indifference on the part of the Church
toward marriage and sex morals, just as the Church would not be completely indifferent toward morals in business or any other field of life. Christian princes and
authorities should also be guided in their regulatory activities by Christian principles, as expounded by the theologians; but to establish and enforce any such
" A.D. 1563.
" As to the following, see Martin Wolff, in THEODOR Kn'p

AND MAETN WOLFF, FAILIENRECHT 9
193I); Esmein, La jurisdiction de N'glise stir kc marriage en occident, 14 NouvaLLE RavuE
HiomQuE DE DROIT 173 (1890).
" Von Ehesachen (1530), 30 MARrn7 LTrrHER's Woaxs, PARr 111, 205 (Weisnar ed. x91o).

(7th ed.
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regulation was to be their task and responsibility rather than the Church's, which
was in almost all Protestant territories closely linked, however, to the temporal
power, either under the Lutheran or Anglican system of princely caesaropapism,
or under the Geneva or Zurich patterns of the Calvinist or Zwinglian city republics.
Not everywhere, it is true, were marital causes handed over to the regular civil
courts. In England they remained in the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts,
which had become courts of the King however, and in many other places they were
to be handled by the consistories, through which the church government was carried on by the princes, city or cantonal councils, or other wielders of secular power.
Soon we find that practically everywhere outside of England the consistories came
to grant permission to a husband to repudiate an unfaithful wife, and every
now and then to allow a wife who had been abandoned by her husband to enter
upon a new marriage. There also grew up a practice among Protestant rulers and
councils of free cities in the exercise of their sovereign powers to grant a subject
the privilege of having his marriage terminated. Originally regarded as a matter
of grace to be exercised according to free discretion, this practice developed in some
places into a fixed routine under which a divorce would be granted almost as a
matter of course in those cases in which adultery, cruelty or desertion could be
proved. This institution of executive divorce by the sovereign became the basis
for that practice of divorce by the legislature which once played a considerable role
in England and in this country2 and which still survives in Canada for the
province of Quebec,2" and it also was the starting point for the practice of divorce
3
by administrative agencies as it presently exists in Denmark, Iceland, and Norway
With the establishment of absolute and all-comprehensive state power, as it
found expression in the newly developed concept of sovereignty, the notion that
marriage constituted a topic of concern to the secular power of the state, and thus
a fit subject for its legislation, could not remain limited to the Protestant countries.
In France this notion assumed particular strength in the course of that policy of
Gallicanism which was aiming at establishing the Church of France, the ancient
Gaul, as a special body within the all embracing Church of Rome, and also establishing for his Catholic Majesty, the King of France, certain ecclesiastical powers
independent of the Pope. This policy, which was eagerly followed by other
Catholic monarchs, resulted in the practical transfer of jurisdiction in matrimonial
causes from the ecclesiastical to the secular courts and also in a similar transfer of
legislation in marriage matters-legislation which, while generally tending to avoid
conflict with the tenets of the Church, still was in the form of regulation by the
secular rather than the ecclesiastical power 4
The break with the spirit of the Church's marriage law was brought about by
21 Cf. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. X90 (A888).

These legislative divorces are granted by the Dominion Parliament.
"Denmark: Law of June 30, 1922, Conclusion and Dissolution of Marriage, §§54, 65; Iceland: Law
of June 28, 1921, §§51-8I; Norway: Law of May 15, 1918, c. 5, §§43, 44, 76.
22

2

JEAN B. BIUssAuD, A HisTORY oF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW 89 (Howell's transl. 1912); Esmein, supra

note 19, at 201 et seq.
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that legislation which took its inspiration from the philosophy of enlightenment and
individualism which had grown up from the sixteenth century to find its classical
expression in the eighteenth century through the French Philosophes,Locke, Kant,
and the jurists of the school of rationalist natural law. 8 There was opposed to the
ancient doctrines of Christian marriage, as it had been developed by the Church
and the theologians both Catholic and Protestant, the inalienable right of the individual to the pursuit of happiness. This right had clearly to include the freedom
of the individual to shake off the tie of an unhappy marriage and to pursue marital
happiness with a new partner. Giving a new meaning to the Protestant Reformers'
view of marriage as an institution of this world rather than a sacrament, it was
now declared to be a civil contract about which natural law established that it could
be freely dissolved at any time, and especially when it turned out to have failed
in its end of bringing happiness to the parties.
The first country in which these new tendencies were to reshape marriage legislation was Prussia,2" whose King, Frederick II (the Great), constituted the very
prototype of the "enlightened" eighteenth century monarch. His decree of 1752
was the first legislative act in modern Europe by which marriage was declared to be
a private affair. That pronouncement was not to be taken quite literally, however;
the state did in no way intend to abandon its regulatory and judicial powers in
matters of matrimony, but divorce was admitted not only for cause but also upon
the basis of mutual agreement and even in the case of unilateral "insuperable
aversion." No clearer and no more consistent expression has ever been given to
the postulates of modern individualism than in this decree of an absolute king,
promulgated exactly two hundred years ago. The provisions of Frederick's decree
were taken over in his successor's General Code of 1794, and they remained the
law of Prussia until the trend was reversed one hundred years later under the
influence of the Catholic Church. But at the time the trend had spread into the
neighboring countries. Among those to be influenced was Austria under its "enlightened" rulers, Maria Theresa and her son Joseph 11.27 While in that predominantly Catholic country the Church was strong enough to prevent the
abolition of its matrimonial system with respect to Catholics, it could not prevent
the emperor from establishing an entirely new system for his non-Catholic subjects
and even from recasting the matrimonial law of the Catholics as state law which,
while in its contents conforming to the demands of the Church, was no longer an
act of its, but of the state's, legislation. Until its absorption into the Greater
Germany of Adolf Hitler, Austria preserved the peculiar feature of different,
state-enacted marriage laws for the different religious denominations. For Catholics,
divorce remained excluded, but to Jews it was to be granted upon the mutual
agreement of the parties, and in the case of non-Catholic Christians it was allowed
2Cf.
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even for unilateral insuperable aversion, provided a judicial separation had first
been obtained.
In France,2" the center of enlightenment thought, the Church's marriage system
was swept away by the Revolution, whose first Constitution declared marriage to
be a civil contract. The law of 1792, which established clear rules after the uncertainty of the early revolutionary outburst, expressly admitted divorce upon mutual
agreement, although hedged in by time-consuming formalities; but the law of
the Revolution did not go quite so far as that of the King of Prussia; it did not
admit unilateral divorce in the case of insuperable aversion. Helped by the powerful impetus of the French revolution and the French armies, the ideas of liberalism
and enlightenment spread over large parts of the Western world, where they found
expression in those secular marriage laws which the governments came to substitute
for the old system of regulation by the church or churches.
In these new secular laws the spirit of liberal individualism and secularism
found expression (i) in the admission or, in places, the compulsory provision, of a
secular ceremony for the conclusion of marriage, (2) in the reduction of the scope
of the prohibited degrees, (3) in the admission of religiously mixed marriages, (4)
in the elevation of the status of the wife from that of an inferior to that of an
equal partner, and (5) although with much vacillations and variations, in the
admission of at least some possibility of divorce, either solely for cause or, as in the
bold legislation of the eighteenth century, upon mutual consent or even unilateral
desire. 9
These trends required a long time to become effective everywhere; indeed, today not even secularization of marriage has been carried through universally. In
Russia and the other countries of Eastern Europe the religious marriage laws of
the Orthodox Church as well as of the minority religions remained in effect as
such and matrimonial causes continued to be handled by ecclesiastical authorities
until the revolutionary events of 1917 and the subsequent spread of their influence.
In the countries of the Near and Middle East, with the exception of Turkey, where
marriage was secularized and westernized by Kamal Atatiirk, 30 regulation of
matrimony and jurisdiction in matrimonial causes still belong to the spheres of the
religious bodies and, except in India and Pakistan, of the ecclesiastical courts, so
that both the laws and the courts are different for Moslems, Jews, and Orthodox,
Catholic, Armenian, Maronite, and other groups of Christians. However, under
the general impact of Western ideas and an increasing uneasiness at the irregularities
resulting from the differences among the religious laws, the secularizing trend
has come to make itself felt even in the Islamic world. It has met there, however,
with strong resistence rooted in the Islamic revival. Quite recently the clash of
these ideas has resulted in serious disturbances and a drawn-out strike of the bar
in the Republic of Lebanon.
28 See note Io supra, BRiSSAUD, op. cit. supra note 24.

"9 See note 7 supra.
" Civil Code of Feb. 17, 1926, arts. 82 et seq.
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In the West, too, the twin trends of secularization and liberalization could not
run their course without encountering opposition. Next to divorce the most controversial problem was that of the formalities required for the conclusion of a
valid marriage.8 ' That no marriage could be concluded without some formal
ceremony became axiomatical after the Council of Trent in all Western countries
except those in the sphere of the English common law. It was equally axiomatic
that the ceremony had to be a religious one. Variations existed only with respect
to the permissibility of the celebration of marriages in ways other than those provided by that church which happened to be the established one in the territory in
question. Would dissenters be compelled to choose between marrying before the
minister of a hated "false" church and living in sin, or would they be allowed to
follow the ceremony of their own denomination? Passions similar to those engendered by this question were aroused again when, after the model of France,
secular governments began to insist that marriages be concluded exclusively in
secular form and before a secular official. The hardship was more apparent than
real, however, because even in those states where "civil marriage" was made compulsory to produce the civil effects of marriage, parties were left free to go through
a subsquent religious ceremony of the denomination of their own choosing. The
problem was avoided completely in those countries in which, as in practically all
American states, 2 the use of a civil ceremony was admitted as optional rather
than prescribed as the only possible form of entering upon a valid marriage. That
a secular ceremony should at least be permissible was a compelling demand, however, of modern secularism, which had to be granted even in a country as staunchly
Catholic as SpainO
Until the end of the nineteenth century, it seemed as if the progress of secularism
and liberalism would be irresistible and as if it were only a question of time until
they attained universal domination. However, since the end of the First World War
it has become apparent that a counter-current has achieved sufficient strength to
stem and, in some places even to reverse, the tide. As a matter of fact, already at
the end of the nineteenth century this counter-trend had been strong enough to
prevent the inclusion of the liberal rules of the old Prussian Code in the new Civil
Code which took effect in Germany on the first of January, I9oo, 4 superseding
thereby the earlier laws of all the component parts of the Reich. Divorce upon
mutual agreement and upon the ground of unilateral insuperable aversion were
abolished. Apart from the case of incurable insanity, divorce was to be admissible
1Cf.
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ANN. CoDE GEN. LAws art. 62, §4 (939)).
" Civil marriage was made compulsory by the Law of June x8, 187o, but religious marriage was
reintroduced in 1875.
By the Civil Code of July 24, 1889, religious marriage was maintained as
compulsory for Catholics, while civil marriage was provided for non-Catholics. By the Spanish Republic civil marriage was again made compulsory (Ordinance of Nov. 3, X93r), but the preRepublican law was restored by the Franco Regime (Laws of Mar. 4, 1938 and Sept. 23, 1939).
"'Civil Code of Aug. 18, [1896] REICH5OESETZBLATr 195.
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only in the case of adultery, desertion, or other misconduct, including, however, the
indefinite and stretchable category of "blameworthy conduct rendering married
life unbearable to the other partner."35 Under the interpretations which were
placed upon this omnibus clause by the courts, especially those of larger cities,
the step backward which the Code of 1896 constituted as against the law of 1752/
1794, was not very considerable. Sensational, however, was the development which
took place under Mussolini's regime in Italy. Ever since Italy's unification as a
nation in the nineteenth century, secular liberalism and conservative Catholicism had
been locked there in an undecided battle. The newly created state had assumed
the role of legislator in the matrimonial field, had liberalized the marriage laws
in various respects, had established civil marriage before a state official as the only
legally effective form of concluding a marriage, and had assumed in its own courts
full jurisdiction in all matrimonial causes. Catholic sentiment was too strong,
however, to allow the abandonment of the principle of indissolubility of marriage.
In the Civil Code of 1865, divorce thus remained excluded. In 1929, when Mussolini was striving for an understanding with the Church, marriage jurisdiction
was handed back to the Church in the Lateran Treaty, which also re-established
as the regular form of marriage its conclusion before the Catholic priest in accordance
with the Catholic rites. The possibility of a civil ceremony was retained as optional,
and there was also introduced the possibility of marriage being celebrated before the
minister, and in accordance with the rites, of any other officially admitted denomination. However, as to Catholic marriages, which constitute the overwhelming majority, the Church was handed back not only the ceremony but also jurisdiction in
matters of nullity and separation. This arrangement38 has survived the collapse of
Fascism and thus the Church's highest tribunal, the Sacra Romana Rota, is still the
supreme court in matrimonial causes for Italy. The Italian step was later followed in
Austria, 37 where it was in turn undone by Hider," and in Franco Spain 9 There has
thus set in a reversal of the former trend of secularization of the law of marriage,
which has found expression not only in the return of jurisdiction in matrimonial
matters to religious authorities but also in a renewed emphasis upon greater strictness,
especially with respect to divorce.
This reversal of the liberal trend has not been limited to countries of strong
Catholic or Islamic influence, but has found expression also in communities which
have been guided by considerations of a purely secular character, such as NationalSocialist Germany or the Soviet Union. In the Third Reich of Adolf Hider the
reform was aimed particularly at strengthening judicial discretion. Where divorce
:'Ild- §1568.
' It was codified inArticles 79 et seq. of the new Civil Code of Mar. it, 1942.
'" Concordate between the Holy See and Austria of June 5, 1933; Austrian Law of May 4, 1935.
"Marriage Law for Greater Germany, of July 6, 1938, [1938] REICuSoESEiBLA-rr 1, 807. It
has been "temporarily" kept in force in Austria after the separation from Germany in 1945.
"Divorce was also abolished in 1932 in Bolivia (Law of April 15, 1932), where it had been admitted in the Civil Code of Oct. 25, 185o.

16

LAW AND .CONTnMPORARY PROBLEMS

for cause had before been a matter of right, it is now to be refused where it would
"not be morally justified."40

In Russia the Revolution of 1917 had brought a shift from the ecclesiastical marriage law of the Orthodox Church to a system of radical secularism and individualism. Under the Czarist regime a religious ceremony was indispensable for the
conclusion of a marriage, and as to divorce, jurisdiction was vested in the religious
bodies, especially the Holy Synod, which would not grant a divorce on any ground
other than adultery, and then only in proceedings of extreme expensiveness and
long drawn out duration. At first under the Bolshevik regime,4 1 both the conclusion and the termination of a marriage were to be strictly private matters. No
ceremony of any kind, religious or secular, was to be necessary for contracting a
marriage, and no public agency's decree or cooperation was to be required for a
divorce. This shift was in keeping with those ideas which Engels had expressed
in Marxism's classical work on the family,42 in which the need for all restrictive sex
regulation was said to have originated in man's cardinal sin, individual property.
Bourgeois marriage was described as a primarily monetary affair, which was supplemented by prostitution and other immorality. As soon as property was collectivized, the need for restrictive sex legislation would disappear, as indeed the
state and all law would wither away. Inequality of the sexes would no longer
exist, and marriage, based on true and pure love and affection, would no longer
need the support of any compulsory authority, be it ecclesiastical or governmental.
The result of the application of this optimistic creed was a situation which in effect
was the same as once existed in ancient Rome; both marriage and divorce were
treated as matters of private concern exclusively. The utmost the state would do
was to record them as a matter of evidence after they had been brought about by
the individual parties', or, in the case of divorce, by one of the parties', own private
act.
Today, thirty-five years after the Revolution, the situation in Russia is different.
Marriage is required to be concluded before an official of the state and to be
officially recorded, and no divorce is possible without the decree of a court. In
order to obtain it application is to be made to the People's Court, which has to
investigate the facts and to attempt a reconciliation of the parties. If the parties, or
one of them, continue in their insistence upon a divorce, the case is certified to a
higher court, where, after a hearing, decision is rendered either granting or deny"'Control Council Law No. 16 (practically identical with the Marriage Law of 1938), §§43, 47;
c. Schoch, Divorce Law and Practice Under National Socialism in Germany, 28 IowA L. REV. 225 (1943).
' On the development of the law of marriage and divorce in the U.S.S.R. see especially Svcrdlov,
Modern Soviet Divorce Practice, ix Moo. L. REv. x63 (1948); and Note, Le mariage et le divorce
d'apras la ligislation actuelle de 1'U.S.S.R., 2 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMNPAR 347 (1950);
furthermore, I VLADIMIR Gsovsru, SOVIET CIVIL LAW: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THEIR BAICKGROUND UNDER
THE SOVIET REGIME III (1948); 2 id. at 239; Gsovski, Marriageand Divorce in Soviet Law, 35 GEo. L.
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290 (1949); Soloveitchik, Family Law and Inheritance Law in USSR, 15 U. OF KAN.

MARMAGE AND DIVORCE LAW OF WESTERN COUNTRIES

17

hag the divorce. The statute does not list any "grounds" upon the proof of which
plaintiff would be entitled to a divorce, but in all cases the decision is entrusted
to the sound discretion of the court. In order to obtain a hearing the petitioner
has to pay a fee of considerable magnitude, which is increased with every new
divorce which he seeks to obtain.
From the sources available it is difficult to obtain a full picture of the Russian
situation. Clearly, the courts have the power to refuse- a divorce and to make it
difficult to obtain one. It would be important to know how they are exercising
their powers. This much is clear, however: marriage and divorce are no longer
matters of purely private concern and again the state has reserved the last word to
itself.
Quite likely the reintroduction of compulsory resort to the state is connected
with the readmission of individual ownership in goods of immediate use and
consumption as well as in savings and the re-establishment of a system of inheritance, testate or intestate, of such assets of individual ownership. In order to
determine a property owner's heirs, it is necessary to have authoritative evidence
of his marital status. However, the change of attitude toward divorce seems to
have deeper reasons and to be connected with that emphasis upon discipline and
order which has come to permeate Soviet life.43 The needs of the planned economy
as well as military considerations no longer permit that freedom of the individual
which inspired the early revolution and which now can be kept only as an ideal
aim to be achieved in that indefinite time when, after the destruction of the last
threat of imperialist capitalism, the period of transition will have ended and that of
full communism begun. At least until then discipline is the duty and virtue of the
Soviet citizen: discipline in labor, discipline in the fight for the proletarian fatherland, and discipline in his personal life. The trend is conspicuous in all walks of
Soviet life-in education, in the arts, in literature, in legal theory, even in linguistics.
In legal theory the doctrine of the laws' and the state's withering away has been
abandoned as the necessity of not only continued but ever-increasing governmental
regulation and police power became apparent; and in the field of language, Stalin
himself has recently condemned theories which were apt to result in looseness of
oral and written expression at the expense of clarity of communication and beauty
of style.
If discipline and the ability to bear hardship are to be necessary for the Soviet
citizen, these virtues must be developed in the family. Here we are meeting, indeed, the consideration which underlies all advocacy of a strict regime of marriage
and divorce, not only in the laws of the Soviets but wherever discipline, order, and
service to an idea are more highly evaluated than the "self-indulgent and egoistic"
pursuit of individual happiness on this earth. The virtues which are needed in a
"s On these trends see John Hazard's Introduction to the volume entitled SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(1951); Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of Marxian Legal Theory,
47 MICH. L. REv. 1157 (949); HAROID J. BERM.tAN, JUSTICE IN RUssIA (950); 1 VLADIMIR GsovsKI,
SOVIET CIVI. LAw: PIVATE RIoHTS AND THERm BACKGROUND UNDER THE SOVIET REGIME 152 (948).
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society of this kind are developed first of all in the family, and marriage is the
crucible from which they emerge, as the parties are steeled in the overcoming of
difficulties. Difficulties will indeed arise in every marriage, even the most harmonious. Spouses must overcome them and in so doing-in, so to speak, battling
their way through to each other-they grow and mature in self-mastery, understanding, patience, and love-that is, in exactly those virtues which strengthen not
only the coherence of society as a whole, but also each individual home in which
children are growing up as the next generation. The ideals which underlie the
old Christian approach to marriage can thus be justified upon a purely secular
basis. However, they are effective only within a system of thought and attitude in
which God, the nation, the proletarian community, or some other transcending
end is placed above the individual as the ultimate value. They are not convincing
to one who regards the individual and his happiness as the ultimate value and the
state or society as no more than a means toward that end.
Which attitude one takes toward marriage, its role in human life, and its duties,
thus depends upon his position toward ultimate values. During the late eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries that individualism which had grown up and developed since the Renaissance in contrast and opposition to the transpersonalism of
traditional Christianity, had assumed sufficient vigor to transform attitudes toward
marriage and divorce almost everywhere in the Western world. How far the
changes would go depended, however, in every country upon the balance between
the contesting forces. Not only in some of the Catholic countries, but also in places
where Protestant Christianity was deeply rooted, the pace of modern secularism
and individualism was slowed and, consequently, was not allowed to bring about
radical changes in the structure of marriage. A new opposing element has appeared
through the rise of modern secular collectivism and totalitarianism, which also had
to oppose or undo individualist transformation of the marriage laws.
The strength of each of these opposing forces does not, of course, depend solely
upon the numerical relations in which the two basic positions are distributed over
the populace. Many, or perhaps most, of its members have not formed their ideas
with articulate clarity. They not only are undecided in their own attitudes, but
often ambiguously vacillate between postulating strictness for the community and
yet expecting accommodation of their own individual desires. Decisively, however,
the power relation depends in each country upon its political structure, which may
well give preponderance to a minority group. In those democracies in particular
where political weight and influence depend upon organization, it is easier to be
organized and thus to be influential for groups united in the strong feelings of
religions or other transpersonalisms than for individualist liberals. The results of
these often unstable relationships have been manifold compromises finding expression not necessarily in the official law but in contradictions between a strict official
law of the books and an actual practice of an entirely different character. In the
Catholic countries of the Latin part of the world, the strictness of the marriage law
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has been tempered through the more or less open acceptance of the mistress system.
In democracies it seems that it has been easier for conservatism to dominate in
the legislature than in the courts. The latter, being closer to the pressures of individual parties and their attorneys, and unable to investigate, as the law would
prescribe, the immense mass of cases brought before them, have more easily yielded
to individualistic demands which have spread through the population without
finding organized expression. The courts have thus come to tolerate collusive
practices through which consent divorces can be easily obtained in spite of their
reprobation by the official law. Such practices have grown up in a good many
places, but quite especially in this country, where unorganized trends, even of
large numerical strength, are finding it particularly difficult to influence the legislatures. This discrepancy between the law of the books and the law in action,
which we find in so many states, has, through its tolerance or promotion of collusive practices and perjury, developed into a serious threat to the morals of the
bar and the respect for law among the public. There seems to be little chance for
a remedy, however, as long as those individualist pressures which are at work in
our present American society are unable to find adequate expression in the legislatures, so that legislative action is more likely to run counter to than to satisfy
those popular demands which either cannot or do not dare to make themselves felt.

